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KNAPP V. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY: THE SEVENTH




On November 9, 1994, Nicholas Knapp and Northwestern Uni-
versity signed a National Letter of Intent. Knapp agreed to attend
Northwestern on an athletic scholarship and play intercollegiate bas-
ketball for the university. At the time Knapp signed that letter,
Northwestern officials were aware that on September 19, 1994,
Knapp's heart had stopped following a pick-up basketball game in his
high school gym. Northwestern officials also knew that when Knapp
signed, it was his intention to take the floor as a member of the Wild-
cat basketball team.
After Knapp had enrolled at the university, Northwestern's team
physician, Dr. Howard Sweeney, an orthopedic surgeon with no prior
cardiovascular expertise, disqualified Knapp from playing intercollegi-
ate basketball because of his cardiac history. Dr. Sweeney's exclusion
decision prompted the school's Athletic Director, Rick Taylor, to
write the Big Ten Conference and make the following statement:
"Northwestern has committed to meet its scholarship obligation to
Mr. Knapp, but, absent a court ruling to the opposite, will not allow
the young man to participate as a team member in practice or games."
In response to Taylor's letter, the Big Ten granted Northwestern leave
to classify Knapp as a "medical non-counter"-an athlete whose ath-
letic scholarship does not count against scholarship limits because that
athlete never again will play intercollegiate basketball.
The Rehabilitation Act of 19731 was created precisely to protect
people like Knapp. That statute serves to prevent institutions like
Northwestern from branding qualified individuals as incapable and
permanently disabled human beings, forcing them to forfeit participa-
tion in life's most major and fulfilling activities. Taylor was correct in
* B.A., Dartmouth College, 1993; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1997. The author
wishes to thank Robert A. Chapman, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Profes-
sor Howard C. Eglit, and James E. Abbott for their assistance in the writing and editing of this
Comment.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1973).
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his statement that only the courts can protect people like Knapp
against discrimination of the kind to which Northwestern subjected its
prized recruit.
So to the courts Knapp went. A federal district court in the
Northern District of Illinois permanently enjoined Northwestern Uni-
versity and its athletic director, Rick Taylor, from barring Knapp from
playing on the university's intercollegiate basketball team.
2
In Knapp v. Northwestern University,3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, and ordered the trial court
to enter summary judgment for Northwestern and Taylor.4 In so do-
ing, the appellate court snubbed existing case law and created an in-
surmountable burden for disabled persons who have been excluded
from essential services or programs. Now, under Knapp, these indi-
viduals are without protection from arbitrary exclusion from services
and programs they seek to enjoy. This Comment addresses the pro-
priety of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's ruling, and
concludes that Northwestern's decision to exclude Knapp from its bas-
ketball program violates the letter and spirit of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.
II. THE REHABILITATION ACT
Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Act") protects "otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual[s]" from discrimination on account of disability by recipients of
federal financial assistance (hereinafter referred to as "recipients").
5
The purpose of the Act is to provide an "evenhanded treatment of
qualified handicapped persons ' 6 and to prevent discrimination based
2. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1198-99 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd, 101
F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997).
3. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997).
4. See id. at 486. In May 1996 Northwestern had filed a motion for summary judgment
which the district court denied at the time it granted Knapp permanent injunctive relief.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The statute provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in sec-
tion 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or ac-
tivity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. "[The Act] applies to each recipient of Federal financial assistance.., and to each program
or activity that receives or benefits from such assistance." 34 C.F.R. § 104.2 (1995). It targets all
federal fund recipients "in an effort to share with handicapped Americans the opportunities for
an education, transportation, housing, health care, and jobs that other Americans take for
granted." School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987) (citing 123
CONG. REc. 13,515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
6. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979).
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on a perceived "inability to function in a particular context."'7 A
prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act re-
quires a plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) she is a "disabled" individual;
(2) she is "otherwise qualified" for the program sought; (3) she is ex-
cluded from the program solely because of the disability; and (4) the
program from which she is excluded is part of a federally funded
program. 8
A "handicapped individual" means any person who "(i) has a
physical impairment 9 which substantially limits one or more [of her]
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, 10 or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment."" "Major life activities" in-
7. Id. at 405.
8. See Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1992). Section 504 allocates the
burdens of proof as follows:
1) The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that he was an otherwise
qualified handicapped person apart from his handicap, and was rejected under circum-
stances which gave rise to the inference that his rejection was based solely on his
handicap;
2) Once plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, defendants have the burden of going
forward and proving that plaintiff was not an otherwise qualified handicapped person,
that is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap,
or that his rejection from the program was for reasons other than his handicap;
3) The plaintiff then has the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence showing
that the defendants' reasons for rejecting the plaintiff are based on misconceptions or
unfounded factual conclusions, and that reasons articulated for the rejection other than
the handicap encompass unjustified consideration of the handicap itself.
Pushkin v. University of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
9. A "physical impairment" means:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental
or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emo-
tional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i).
10. "Has a record of such an impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as
having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties." Id. § 104.3(j)(2)(iii).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1973); see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.3 (defining "handicapped per-
son."). The definition reflects Congressional concern for protecting the handicapped from (1)
simple prejudice; (2) "archaic attitudes and laws;" and (3) "the fact that the American people are
simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handi-
caps." School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (citing S. REP. No.
93-1297, at 50 (1974)). "Is regarded as having an impairment" means:
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but that is treated by a recipient [of federal financial assistance] as constitut-
ing such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;
or (C) has none of the impairments ... but is treated ... as having such an impairment.
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(iv). The Act protects those who are regarded as having a physical impair-
ment even when they do not. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 279. The detrimental consequences of
illegal discrimination can be just as real for someone who is so "regarded" as for someone who
actually has such an impairment. See id. at 284. The Supreme Court has aptly noted: "A person
19981
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dude, but are not limited to, "functions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning and working. ' 12 Courts determine whether a person is
"handicapped" within the meaning of the Act on a case-by-case
basis.
13
"An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his handicap."'1 4 For purposes of
Section 504, an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual is one
who is able to perform the essential functions or meets the essential
eligibility requirements of a position, 15 or one who, if unable to per-
form the essential functions of a position, can do so if the recipient
engages in "reasonable accommodation."' 16 If an accommodation im-
poses "undue financial and administrative burdens" on a recipient' 7 or
requires "a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program,"'
8
who .. is regarded as having an impairment may at present have no actual incapacity at all.
Such a person would be exactly the kind of individual who could be 'otherwise qualified' to
participate in covered programs [under Section 504]." Davis, 442 U.S. at 405 n.6.
12. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii). Congress used the phrase "such as" to indicate that the defi-
nition of "major life activities" was not all-inclusive, but rather, a nonexhaustive laundry list. See
Pahulu v. University of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (D. Kan. 1995) ("The major life activities
enumerated ... are not an all inclusive list.").
13. See Dutton v. Johnson County Bd., 859 F. Supp. 498, 506 (D. Kan. 1994) ("status as a
disabled individual is a highly fact-sensitive issue, requiring an individualized inquiry and case-
by-case determination"); Byrne, 979 F.2d at 565 ("Whether or not a person is handicapped under
the Act is an individualized inquiry, best suited to a case-by-case determination.").
14. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406.
15. "Qualified handicapped person" means:
(1) With respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable ac-
comodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question;
(3) With respect to postsecondary and vocational educational services, a handicapped
person who meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or par-
ticipation in the recipient's educational program or activity;
(4) With respect to other services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligi-
bility requirements for the receipt of such services.
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k).
16. Id. § 104.12(a). Section 104.12(a) provides: "A recipient shall make reasonable accom-
modation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped
applicant or employee ...." Section 104.12(b) provides: "Reasonable accommodation may
include: (1) Making facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by handicapped
persons, and (2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modifi-
cation of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar ac-
tions." Id. § 104.12(b).
17. Davis, 442 U.S. at 412.
18. Id. at 410. Courts consider the following factors to determine whether an accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on a recipient:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect to [the] number of employ-
ees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and structure of the
recipient's workforce; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
[Vol. 73:709
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it is not reasonable. Put another way, failure to hire or promote a
disabled person is not handicap discrimination unless reasonable ac-
commodation can overcome the effects of an individual's disability
without presenting an undue burden on the recipient. 19
Whether a recipient has in fact discriminated on the basis of
handicap is the ultimate inquiry under the Act.20 A recipient of fed-
eral financial assistance does not elude the proscription of the Act
even if it acted in good faith 2' and/or had a rational basis for discrimi-
nation.22 A recipient may, however, exclude an otherwise qualified
disabled individual from its program if it has a substantial overriding
justification for the exclusion.
23
III. LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Major Life Activity
An athlete asserting the right to actively participate in a recipi-
ent's athletic program must first establish that participation in sports is
a "major life activity." While the issue is not free from controversy,
the balance of authority holds that sports competition constitutes a
major life activity. Courts determine what constitutes a major life ac-
tivity on an individualized basis, so a particular sport need only be a
major life activity as to a particular plaintiff.24
34 C.F.R. § 104.12(c).
19. See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 n.17 (1987) (citing 45
C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A (1985)).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
21. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294-301 (1985).
22. See Pushkin v. University of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th Cir. 1981).
The rational basis test is not applicable where there is an alleged violation of a statute,
§ 504, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap. That statute by its very
terms does not provide that a recipient of federal financial assistance may act in an
unreasonable manner to promote legitimate governmental means, even if discrimina-
tion should be the result. Rather, the statute provides that a recipient of federal finan-
cial assistance may not discriminate on the basis of handicap, regardless of whether
there is a rational basis for so discriminating. The inquiry has to be on whether the
[recipient] has, in fact, discriminated on the basis of handicap. The mere fact that [a
recipient] acted in a rational manner is no defense to an act of discrimination.
Id.; see also Pahulu v. University of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Pushkin
and the inapplicability of the rational basis test in the context of Section 504).
23. See, e.g., Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[E]xclusion of handi-
capped children from a school activity is not improper if there exists a substantial justification
.... "); Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (concluding
that three physician opinions lacking medical basis cannot serve as a substantial justification for
exclusion of disabled athlete).
24. See Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1393 (finding that intercollegiate football may be a major
life activity for a particular plaintiff); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 863 F.
Supp. 483, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (finding that interscholastic track and cross-country may be a
major life activity for the "disabled" plaintiffs), rev'd on other grounds and dismissed in part, 64
1998]
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Sports participation plays an integral role in the lives of dedi-
cated, competitive athletes. The Knapps of the world often devote
more time to developing their athletic skills than to any other life ac-
tivity. Both the federal Department of Education and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, with the oversight and approval
of Congress, have recognized the unique importance of physical activ-
ities to students attending college:
In providing physical education courses and athletics and similar
programs and activities to any of its students, a recipient to which
this subpart applies may not discriminate on the basis of handicap.
A recipient that offers physical education courses or that operates
or sponsors intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics shall pro-
vide to qualified handicapped students an equal opportunity for
participation in these activities.
25
Following this lead, several district courts have concluded that in-
tercollegiate or interscholastic sports are a major life activity. For ex-
ample, in Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,26 a New
Jersey district court held that the school board violated the Act when
it denied a student-athlete with only one kidney the right to actively
participate in interscholastic wrestling. 27 The court concluded that the
student-athlete and his parents had made a rational decision, based
upon medical consultation, in favor of athletic participation, and that
the exclusion of the student constituted illegal discrimination. 28
Similarly, in deciding Wright v. Columbia University,29 a federal
district court concluded that the school violated the Act when it re-
fused to allow a student-athlete with one eye to actively participate in
F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). Whether a person is "disabled" (i.e., has an impairment which sub-
stantially limits a major life activity) is an individualized determination, to be decided on a case-
by-case basis. See Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996);
Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1992).
25. 34 C.F.R. § 104.47(a)(1) (1997); 45 C.F.R. § 84.37(c)(1) (1997). Similar regulations have
been issued with respect to interscholastic sports:
In providing physical education courses and athletics and similar programs and activi-
ties to any of its students, a recipient to which this subpart applies may not discriminate
on the basis of handicap. A recipient that offers physical education courses or that
operates or sponsors interscholastic, club, or intramural athletics shall provide to quali-
fied handicapped students an equal opportunity for participation in these activities.
34 C.F.R. § 104.37(c); 45 C.F.R. § 84.
26. 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
27. See id. at 954.
28. See id. To be sure, the Poole court did not expressly address the issue of major life
activity but could not have found a Rehabilitation Act violation without recognizing, at least
implicitly, that intercollegiate sports (wrestling) constituted a major life activity for the plaintiff.
See also Grube, 550 F. Supp. 418 (holding that a high school football player with one kidney
was "disabled" within the meaning of the Act and enjoining the school district from precluding
him from participating as a member of its football team).
29. 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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its intercollegiate football program.30 The court held that the athlete
was "disabled" within the meaning of the Act, 31 and ultimately or-
dered Columbia to give him the opportunity to play in its intercollegi-
ate football program.
32
Scholarly commentary concerning the relationship of the Act to
the right of student-athletes to participate in athletics further supports
the proposition that competitive sports participation squares with the
definition of major life activity:
There can be little doubt that an athlete who has suffered a serious
injury or illness and is precluded from playing because of that condi-
tion is an 'individual with [disabilities]' as defined by Section 504
and its implementing regulations, although there may be disagree-
ment as to whether it is the preexisting condition or fear of future
injury that creates the handicapping condition.
33
A student-athlete seeking protection from discrimination vis-a-vis
Section 504 is not sidelined even if a court finds sports participation is
not, in and of itself, a major life activity. Sports participation provides
dedicated athletes with very unique learning experiences, and learning
is an enumerated life activity.34 Along these lines, courts addressing
the statutory right of student-athletes to participate in sports have
found that sports participation is a unique learning experience subject
to protection under the Act. To this end, a Michigan district court
reasoned that interscholastic sports were a subset of learning and
therefore a major life activity. 35 The court stated:
Defendant downgrades the importance of interscholastic sports in
plaintiffs' learning programs. [Plaintiff] has better grades as a result
of his involvement on the cross-country and track teams and attrib-
utes his improved performance to his interaction with his cross-
30. See id. at 793-95.
31. See id. at 793.
32. See id. at 795; see also Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440,
445 (N.D. Il. 1988) (holding that contact sports were a major life activity for elementary school
student with AIDS). The Doe case is subject to two interpretations. One court has cited it for
the proposition stated above. See Pahulu v. University of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (D. Kan.
1995). The more likely interpretation of Doe, however, is that social interaction with one's peers
is the "major life activity" and an individual with AIDS who cannot participate in contact sports
or experience sexual intimacy faces a "substantial limitation" on social interaction.
33. Cathy Jones, College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40
BuFF. L. REV. 113, 178-80 (1992); see also Mathew Mitten, Sports Participation by "Handicapped
Athletes," 10-SPG Er. & SPORTS L. REV. 15, 17 (1992) (noting that "athletics constitutes a
'major life activity' for many people"); Matthew Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or
Physical Abnormalities: Who Makes the Participation Decision," 71 NEB. L. REV. 987, 1010
(1992) ("Athletics, which require the performance of strenuous manual tasks, constitute a 'major
life activity' for many people.").
34. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1995).
35. See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 483, 489 (E.D.
Mich. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
1998]
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country and track teammates who encourage him to study and to be
disciplined . . . [P]laintiff has improved social relationships as a
result of his participation on the cross-country and track
teams . . Because participation on the cross-country and track
team is an important and integral part of the education of plaintiffs,
it is as to them a major life activity. Thus, plaintiffs' disability limits
a major life activity as contemplated by ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act.
36
Likewise, in deciding Pahulu v. University of Kansas,37 a Kansas
district court concluded that "intercollegiate football may be a major
life activity, i.e. learning. ' 38 In that case, the University of Kansas had
disqualified a scholarship athlete with a congenitally narrow cervical
canal from competing in its football program.39
As a matter of common sense, sports participation fits the rubric
of "learning." Among other things, sports participation helps to instill
in athletes positive character traits such as confidence, leadership,
teamwork, discipline, dedication, perseverance, and patience. In addi-
tion, sports participation affords athletes the opportunity for recogni-
tion in their communities. Moreover, it fosters the ability to set
priorities and goals, to compete, and to take coaching, direction, and
criticism. In sum, applicable federal regulations, case law and com-
mon sense leave little doubt that sports participation by people like
36. Id.
37. 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995).
38. Id. at 1393; see also University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 302
(Tex. App. 1993) (noting that competitive athletics can benefit students emotionally); Brenden v.
Independent Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Discrimination in high school
interscholastic athletics constitutes discrimination in education [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983].").
Even the NCAA recognizes the educational role that intercollegiate competition plays in the life
of student-athletes:
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital
part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain inter-
collegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by doing so, retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.
NCAA Constitution, Art. 1 § 1.3.1 ("Basic Purpose"). Further, many universities recognize the
educational element of intercollegiate sports. For example, Northwestern University takes this
position regarding its athletic program:
Intercollegiate athletics have long been an integral and visible aspect of Northwestern
University life. The success of the athletic program does not rest solely on wins and
losses. Rather, success in intercollegiate athletics at Northwestern University is inextri-
cably linked to the educational mission of the University, especially with regard to the
academic and personal development of student-athletes and the institution's commit-
ment to honoring the highest standards of amateur competition.
1995 Presidential Directive on Self-Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics, Northwestern Univ.,
(1995) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
39. See Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1388.
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Knapp, either in and of itself or as a subset of learning, is a major life
activity. 40
B. Substantial Limitation
An athlete with a physical impairment that limits major life activ-
ities does not meet the Act's definition of a disabled individual. The
law, as Congress wrote it, requires an individual to have an impair-
ment that substantially limits his/her major life activities. In other
words, not every impairment affecting major life activities is a substan-
tially limiting one.41 This issue is best illustrated by example. Assume
a hospital denies a physician admission to its residency program be-
cause of an eye condition, i.e., strabismus. 42 The hospital defends on
grounds that because its residency program requires long shifts, the
physician, because of his eye condition, will be unable to work them.
On these facts, the physician has an impairment (strabismus) limiting
a major life activity (working). However, the hospital's exclusion does
not substantially limit his ability to work43 because not all residency
programs require long shifts and the physician could pursue other
residency programs better suited to his ability. In sum, the law does
not protect the hypothetical doctor, because the Act does not secure
for disabled individuals the program of choice. 44
40. The underlying policy of the Rehabilitation Act-providing handicapped individuals
with the opportunity to participate in activities in which they have the physical capability and
skill to perform-lends even further credence to this proposition. A line of employment cases
casts whatever "little doubt" there is on the notion that sports participation is a major life activ-
ity. See Scharff v. Frank, 791 F.Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (finding that a letter carrier
unable to engage in sports was not "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act); see also
Taylor v. United States Postal Serv., 771 F. Supp. 882, 887 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (finding that a letter
carrier unable to participate in football, basketball, softball, and running was not "handicapped"
within the meaning of the Act), rev'd on other grounds, 996 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991); Stone v.
Energy Serv., Inc., 1995 WL 368473 *4 (E.D. La. 1995) (finding that a plaintiff, who was unable
to play sports, was not "disabled"). These cases, however, all involve recreational as opposed to
organized interscholastic or intercollegiate sports. An obvious distinction exists between recrea-
tional sports (e.g., jogging, YMCA basketball) and interscholastic or intercollegiate sports. Rec-
reational sports generally do not involve competition among highly trained and skilled athletes,
nor do they require the tremendous time commitment and sacrifice on the part of its partici-
pants, which is so critical to the success of student-athletes and the athletic programs in which
they participate.
41. See Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 573 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995).
42. Cf id.
43. "The key is the extent to which the impairment restricts a major life activity; the impair-
ment must be a significant one." Id. at 1454. "The term 'substantially limits' means that the
individual is either unable to perform, or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which the individual can perform, a major life activity as compared to an average
person in the general population." Id. at 1454 n.12.
44. See Scharff, 791 F. Supp. at 184-85 (finding that plaintiff, who suffered musculoskeletal
injuries, was not substantially limited because she was merely excluded from a narrow range of
jobs). That court stated:
1998]
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Drawing from this analysis, in Welsh v. City of Tulsa,45 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, did not violate the Reha-
bilitation Act when its city physician disqualified an aspiring
firefighter because he had decreased sensation in two fingers.46
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff "had a lifelong goal of be-
coming a firefighter and had obtained a college degree in Safety with
the specific goal of becoming a firefighter, '47 the court held that he
was not substantially limited in a major life activity.48
In similar fashion, the Pahulu court held that the university disqualifi-
cation decision, premised upon the substantial risk of injury to the
scholarship athlete posed by his competing in intercollegiate football,
did not substantially limit the major activity in his life that was at is-
sue, i.e. learning.49 The fact that the University of Kansas excluded
the football player from only one extracurricular activity was enough
for that court to conclude that he was not substantially limited, given
that other activities at school would provide him with the same educa-
tional benefits. 50 The student continued to receive his scholarship,
still had a role with the team, and was given access to all team bene-
fits, except the opportunity to play, and so the court determined that
the athlete could attend games, travel with the team, eat at the train-
[W]e find that these impairments did not substantially limit one or more of the plain-
tiff's major life activities. The plaintiff's inability to engage in competitive sporting
events and other unusually demanding physical activities did not constitute a substan-
tial impairment of the plaintiff's major life activities. Furthermore, the fact that the
plaintiff was temporarily unable to perform her work in the bakery does not demon-
strate that she suffered from a substantial impairment of her major life activities. "An
impairment that affects only a narrow range of jobs can be regarded as not reaching a
major life activity or as not substantially limiting one." The fact that the plaintiff was
unable to perform her job at the bakery, which required an unusual strain on her wrists,
does not demonstrate that her physical impairments prevented her from performing
more than a narrow range of jobs. Therefore, we find that the plaintiff does not have a
record of impairment which substantially limited one or more of her major life
activities.
Id. (citation omitted).
45. 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992).
46. See id. at 1416.
47. Id. at 1419.
48. See id. at 1419. In holding, the court stated:
We agree ... that an impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's
ability to perform only one job is not a handicap under the Act. Any other interpreta-
tion would render meaningless the requirement that the impairment substantially limits
a major activity. "It was open to Congress to omit these limiting adjectives, but Con-
gress did not do so." Finally, while we do not question the sincerity of Welsh's desire to
become a firefighter, that desire, alone, is insufficient to bring him within the definition
of a handicapped individual under the Act.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
49. See Pahulu v. University of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1393-94 (D. Kan. 1995).
50. See id. at 1393.
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ing table, and reap the same educational benefits from intercollegiate
football as players able to practice and play in games.
But does a recipient really satisfy the Rehabilitation Act by tell-
ing an individual who has trained for years-perhaps a lifetime-to
participate in her chosen field that she can now join a different field or
program and receive the same major life experience? This precise
question was raised in E.E. Black v. Marshall,51 in which the court
answered as follows:
[T]his type of definition [of "substantially limited"] drastically
reduces the coverage of the Act, and undercuts the purposes for
which the Act was intended. A person, for example, who has ob-
tained a graduate degree in chemistry, and is then turned down for a
chemist's job because of an impairment, is not likely to be heart-
ened by the news that he can still be a streetcar conductor, an attor-
ney or a forest ranger. A person who is disqualified from
employment in his chosen field has a substantial handicap to em-
ployment, and is substantially limited in one or more of his major
life activities. The definitions contained in the Act are personal and
must be evaluated by looking at the particular individual. A [dis-
abled] individual is one who "has a physical or mental disability
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial hand-
icap to employment .... ." It is the impaired individual that must be
examined, and not just the impairment in the abstract.52
E.E. Black involved a highly trained apprentice carpenter 53 who
was denied employment because of a perceived congenital back ab-
normality and its accompanying risks in the context of performing
tasks, including heavy labor.5 4 The court ultimately concluded that
the plaintiff was substantially limited in his pursuit of becoming a jour-
neyman carpenter because no similar positions, i.e., positions of a car-
penter, were available.
55
51. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
52. Id. at 1099.
53. He had accumulated 3600 hours of on-the-job training. See id. at 1091.
54. Medical opinion, though, stated that he could perform all of the necessary tasks of the
job. See id. at 1091-92.
55. See id. at 1102. The court stated that the definition of "substantially limited" is broad in
scope:
Congress intended the coverage of the Act to be broad in scope and intended that
questions as to that coverage be answered on a case-by-case basis. Both of these inten-
tions would be defeated if the coverage of the Act were reduced because of narrow
definitions of "substantially limits" and "substantial handicap to employment."
Id. In addressing the substantial limitation issue, the court noted:
Factors that are important in the case-by-case determination are the number and types
of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified ... Next, it must be deter-
mined to what geographical area the applicant has reasonable access . . . Finally, the





If assimilation of a "disabled" student-athlete into a program
would present a substantial risk of injury to herself or third parties, a
recipient has a substantial justification under the Rehabilitation Act
for an exclusion decision.5 6 At the same time, exclusion decisions
based upon fears of remote or minimal medical risks violate the letter
and spirit of the Rehabilitation Act. "Any qualification based on the
risk of future injury must be examined with special care if the Reha-
bilitation Act is not to be circumvented easily, since almost all handi-
capped persons are at a greater risk [of injury]. ' ' 57 A mere elevation
of risk, without more, is insufficient to find that a disabled individual is
not "otherwise qualified. '58
In Poole, the defendant argued that the student-athlete plaintiff,
who had only one kidney, was not "otherwise qualified" to compete in
Id. at 1100-01. The EEOC codified these factors at the equal employment provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (1995).
The EEOC also defined "substantial limitation" with respect to the major life activity of working
in the same regulations:
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to per-
form a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i). The Department of Education and the Department of Health and
Human Services promulgated regulations pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. See Pahulu v. Uni-
versity of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104 (1995); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84 (1994)). These regulations do not define "substantial limitation." In commentary, both
Departments acknowledge "the lack of any definition in the proposed regulation of the phrase
'substantially limits.' The Department does not believe that a definition of this term is possible
at this time." Id. at 1392-93 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104, app. A at 372; 84 C.F.R. § 84, app. A at
355).
56. See Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991) ("An individual is
not qualified ... if there is a genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could
injure others .... "); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the
touchstone of the "otherwise qualified" issue is the "substantiality of the risk" to the disabled
individual and others); see also Wolff v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 534 F. Supp. 758, 762
(N.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that plaintiff is not "otherwise qualified" where she is at a "substantial
degree of physical risk" to her safety); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440,
445 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding that plaintiff with AIDS is "otherwise qualified" unless he poses a
"significant risk" of infecting others). Based upon case law involving the Rehabilitation Act, the
EEOC, pursuant to the ADA, has defined a direct threat of injury as a "significant risk of sub-
stantial harm." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
57. Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Ci. 1982).
58. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
Individuals with handicaps are all too often excluded from school and educational pro-
grams ... a more active and extensive effort than "non-discrimination" must be made
to eliminate barriers to employment of the handicapped .... A mere "elevated risk"
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interscholastic wrestling because he could not pass a physical. 59 The
Board of Education required that students pass the physical as a pred-
icate to participation in interscholastic sports. The court, however,
reasoned that the student-athlete had failed to pass the medical exam
because he had only one kidney and noted:
Although some doctors, and especially the school system's medical
director ... believe that it is inadvisable for a student with one kid-
ney to participate in wrestling, there is also medical opinion, repre-
sented by the opinions of [plaintiff's two physicians], that [the
plaintiff] could safely participate in the sport of wrestling. Giving
the plaintiff the benefit of all doubts, it could be concluded that the
better view was that participation in wrestling was safe for [the
plaintiff] .60
The court accordingly held that the plaintiff was "otherwise quali-
fied" and so the defendant's exclusion of him violated the Act.61 Spe-
cifically, the court ruled that the Board "had neither the duty nor the
right under § 504" to substitute "its own rational decision over the
rational decision of [the athlete and his family]. '"62 The most telling
language in the opinion was the following:
It is undoubtedly true that injury to [the plaintiff's] kidney would
have grave consequences, but so might other injuries that might be-
fall him or any other member-of the wrestling team. Hardly a year
goes by that there is not at least one instance of the tragic death of a
healthy youth as a result of competitive sports activity. Life has
risks. The purpose of § 504, however, is to permit handicapped in-
dividuals to live life as fully as they are able, without paternalistic
authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky for them.
63
Similarly, in Wright, the Columbia University football player with
one eye demonstrated through a highly qualified ophthalmologist that
the risk of serious eye injury from playing intercollegiate football was
not substantial.64 Columbia argued that the athlete was not "other-
59. See Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 953 (D.N.J. 1980). The
decision of the Board stemmed from legal and moral concern over possible damage to the stu-
dent-athlete's remaining kidney. The Board's position was reflected in an opinion letter written
by its physician:
It is in the best interest of the students to bar them from contact sports despite the
wrath from both students and parents. How can you justify and explain to the student
who has one kidney and the other destroyed that his death or lifelong attachment to a
kidney machine was worth the "glory."
Id. at 952.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 953-54. There was no question that the plaintiff had the ability to pin his
opponents to the mat. Id.
62. Id. at 954.
63. Id. at 953-54.
64. See Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Grube v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that a football player
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wise qualified" to play because contact sports could have rendered
him sightless.65 The court rejected the argument and stated:
Such motives, while laudably evidencing Columbia's concern for its
students' well-being, derogate from the rights secured to plaintiff
under Section 504, which prohibits "paternalistic authorities" from
deciding that certain activities are "too risky" for a handicapped
person .... Moreover, the public interest is enhanced by plaintiff's
"dramatic example" that "hard work and dedication to purpose can
overcome odds."
'66
In Pahulu, however, the Kansas district court blazed new trails in
the law when it excluded plaintiff, a scholarship athlete with a con-
genitally narrow cervical canal, from playing intercollegiate football
for the University of Kansas. After finding that the exclusion decision
did not substantially limit plaintiff's opportunity to learn, the court
leaped to the conclusion that the athlete was not "otherwise qualified"
to play because he could not "satisfy the program's requirements, e.g.,
medical clearance for participation .... ,,67 Three specialists opined
that the risk of permanent injury to the plaintiff from playing football
was "no greater than any other player's risk."' 68 The court, however,
deemed the contrary conclusions of the university's physicians to be
"reasonable and rational" and concluded that the disqualification de-
cision was "supported by substantial competent evidence for which
the court [was] unwilling to substitute its judgment. '69
IV. KNAPP V. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
A. Introduction
On September 19, 1994, Nicholas Knapp experienced ventricular
fibrillation 70 (hereinafter referred to as "VF") following a pick-up bas-
with one kidney could participate in interscholastic football because the defendant school district
lacked a medical basis for the athlete's exclusion).
65. See Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 794.
66. Id. (citations omitted). The court also acknowledged that the plaintiff was a mature,
intelligent, and motivated young man capable of making decisions affecting his health and well-
being. See id. Indeed, other courts have held that college students are responsible adults fully
capable of making their own decisions. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 140 (3d
Cir. 1979) (noting that modem college students are adults and "vigorously claim the right to
define and regulate their own lives").
67. Pahulu v. University of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1393-94 (D. Kan. 1995).
68. Id. at 1394.
69. Id.
70. During an event of ventricular fibrillation, the heart fails to contract in its normal
rhythm. Blood flow through the heart and to the rest of the body stops. This causes clinical
cardiac death. If a normal heart rhythm is not restored within a very short time, VF can lead to
brain damage, permanent injury to other vital organs and biological death. See MosaY's EMER-
GENCY DICTIONARY 165 (James G. Yvorra, ed. 1989).
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ketball game in his high school gym. 71 Paramedics immediately re-
vived Knapp through the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
electronic defibrillation and drugs.72 On October 3, 1996, Knapp's
physician implanted a cardioverter defibrillator 73 (hereinafter referred
to as "ICD") in his abdomen to restart his heart in the event of recur-
rent VF.
74
Several weeks later, Knapp and Northwestern University signed a
National Letter of Intent which required Knapp-at the time rated
among the best basketball players in Illinois-to attend Northwestern
and play basketball for the Wildcats.75 But on November 7, 1995, af-
ter Knapp had matriculated at Northwestern, Dr. Sweeney disquali-
fied him from playing intercollegiate basketball because of the
September 1994 VF episode and because Knapp had an ICD im-
71. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2454 (1997).
72. See id.
73. An implantable cardioverter defibrillator is an implantable device designed automati-
cally to detect a serious "fast heart rhythm" such as VF or ventricular tachycardia. When an
arrhythmia is detected, the device delivers a pre-programmed form of therapy to the heart to
convert the abnormal rhythm back to normal. The components of Knapp's ICD include a gener-
ator implanted in his abdominal wall and wires or "leads" which extend from the generator
through certain veins leading to his heart. The device is programmed to deliver an electrical
discharge when it recognizes the preprogrammed criteria for a fast heart rate to restore the
patient's normal cardiac rhythm. The device can deliver several discharges for an ongoing VF
episode. It also has the capability to assess and reassess the patient's rhythm in a matter of
seconds before delivering the discharge, since many heart rhythms, including VF, may stop spon-
taneously. ICDs can be "interrogated" by a physician in a matter of minutes to determine
whether any malfunction in its performance exists. The ability of the ICD to restore fast heart
rhythms to their normal rate has been recognized. The available data indicate that the ICD has
at least a 95-99% success rate in restoring the normal heart rate following VF. See Affidavit of
John H. McAnulty, M.D. at 4-5, Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997) (No. 95 C 6454) [hereinafter Affidavit of John H. McAnulty,
M.D.]; see also David S. Cannom, Internal Cardioverter Defibrillator: Newer Technology and
Newer Devices, CARDIAC ARRHYTHMIA 708 (Philip J. Podrid & Peter R. Kowey eds., 1995) ("All
series show that the recurrent sudden death rate has been lowered to 2-3% or less per year with
the ICD."). In addition, the device provides the physician with realtime information about its
detection and therapy parameters and status. The device provides the accumulated data on its
operation between interrogations, including stored electrograms, records of episodes detected
and treated, and the efficacy of therapy. All of this information can be printed and retained in a
patient's file. See Affidavit of John H. McAnulty, M.D., supra, at 5.
74. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 476. Knapp's ICD was set to recognize VF if his heart reaches a
rate of 220 beats per minute. The heart rate of an athlete exercising at maximum intensity is
generally considered to be less than 200 beats per minute. See Affidavit of John H. McAnulty,
M.D., supra note 73, at 13.
75. See id. At the time Knapp signed the letter of intent, Northwestern was aware that
Knapp had experienced VF and received an ICD. Northwestern also knew that when Knapp
signed the Letter of Intent, it was his intention to play basketball as a freshman. See Knapp v.
Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd, 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997).
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planted. 76 Wishing to play basketball for Northwestern,77 Knapp sued
the university and its athletic director, Rick Taylor,78 for injunctive
relief 79 under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.80
76. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 476-77. In arriving at its exclusion decision, Northwestern relied
heavily on the 26th Bethesda Conference, a national medical conference held in Bethesda,
Maryland, to establish guidelines related to the eligibility of athletes with cardiac conditions to
participate in sports. See 26th Bethesda Conference, Recommendations for Determining Eligibil-
ity for Competition in Athletes with Cardiovascular Abnormalities, 24 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 845
(1994). Major players in cardiology and sports medicine participated in the 26th Bethesda Con-
ference which was sponsored by the American College of Cardiology and the American College
of Sports Medicine. The Conference's Co-Chairman, Barry J. Maron, M.D., Director of Cardio-
vascular Research at the Minneapolis Heart Institute Foundation, was one of two Northwestern
expert witnesses at trial. Northwestern's other expert, witness Douglas Zipes, M.D., was the
author of the recommendations of the Conference's Task-Force on Arrhythmias. The Confer-
ence found that:
Competitive sports can place an athlete with a cardiovascular abnormality at medical
risk because of an increase in work load on the heart or stress on the vascular system
caused by increases in blood flow and pressure and increased body temperature. This
may be reflected in an increased risk for sudden death, life-threatening cardiovascular
alterations or disease progression.
Id. at 864.
The efficacy with which [ICDs] will terminate a potentially lethal arrhythmia under the
extreme conditions of competitive sports is currently unknown. For athletes with im-
plantable defibrillators or antitachycardia devices, all moderate and high intensity
sports are contraindicated.
Athletes with these conditions [VF] that result in cardiac arrest in the presence or ab-
sence of structural heart disease cannot participate in any moderate or high intensity
competitive sports.
Id. at 897.
77. Knapp did not participate as a player on the 1995-96 men's basketball team at North-
western. During that period, his role was strictly limited to observing each practice or game. See
Knapp, 101 F.3d at 477. On April 15, 1996, after completion of the 1995-96 basketball season,
Northwestern submitted a "Petition for Waiver of Conference Rules" to the Big Ten Confer-
ence. Northwestern moved to have Knapp declared a "medical non-counter" so that his athletic
scholarship would not count against the total number of allowable basketball scholarships that
the school, as a member of the NCAA and the Big Ten, could have at one time. See Big Ten
Rule 15.5.1.4 ("A tender awarded to a student-athlete may be exempted from the financial aid
limitations if the student-athlete becomes injured or ill to the point the player will never be able
to compete in intercollegiate athletics."). On May 8, 1996, the Big Ten approved the request to
exempt Knapp as a "counter" beginning with the 1996-97 academic year. See id.
78. On May 2, 1996, following its submission of the Petition for Waiver to the Big Ten,
Northwestern, through Rick Taylor, wrote its letter to the Big Ten requesting that it grant the
Petition.
79. A court will grant injunctive relief only if a party seeking it establishes: 1) she has suc-
ceeded on the merits; 2) no adequate remedy at law exists, 3) irreparable harm will arise absent
injunctive relief; 4) the balance of harms favors entry of injunction, and 5) the entry of the
injunction will not harm the public interest. See United States v. Rural Elec. Convenience Coop.
Co., 922 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1991).
80. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 477.
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B. District Court Proceedings
The district court8' held two evidentiary hearings at which five
cardiologists testified regarding Knapp's present cardiovascular condi-
tion, the risk to him of future injury, and reasonable accommodations,
if any. Although the court heard conflicting medical testimony, it ulti-
mately concluded that Northwestern had violated the Act because it
had excluded Knapp, an "otherwise qualified disabled individual,"
from its intercollegiate basketball program.82 Accordingly, the court
granted Knapp permanent injunctive relief and ordered Northwestern
to afford him the opportunity to play for its basketball team.
83
Initially, the district court concluded that "intercollegiate sports
competition may constitute a major life activity. ' 84 The court recog-
nized the "major role" that intercollegiate sports plays in a "student's
education and learning process" and cited the relevant regulations and
case law.8 5 The court held that, "without doubt," high school basket-
ball "has played a substantial role in Knapp's education and learning
process" and is a major activity in his life.86
Next, the court determined that Northwestern "substantially lim-
ited" Knapp's ability to play intercollegiate basketball. 87 "It is the
playing of basketball that teaches discipline, teamwork, and persever-
ance," the court reasoned, and "[tihese traits are not developed by
81. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd, 101 F.3d 473
(7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997).
82. See id. at 1193-99. Northwestern acknowledged that it is a recipient of federal financial
assistance. Northwestern also conceded that it "regarded" Knapp as having a "physical [cardio-
vascular] impairment" and that it excluded Knapp from its program solely on the basis of his
impairment. Thus, the only questions for the court were whether Knapp was "disabled" and
"otherwise qualified." See id. at 1194.
83. See id. at 1199; see also Matt O'Connor, Judge orders NU to let recruit with heart prob-
lem play, CHI. TRIa., Sept. 10, 1996, § 4, at 1.
84. Knapp, 942 F. Supp. at 1195.
85. See id.
86. See id. The court credited Knapp's affidavit, which stated:
My participation in competitive basketball has provided me and could continue to pro-
vide me with a unique experience that I have not encountered in any other extracurric-
ular activity in which I have been involved or in which I could possibly become
involved. Among other things, competitive basketball has helped to instill in me the
following character traits: confidence, dedication, leadership, teamwork, discipline, per-
severance, patience, the ability to set priorities, the ability to compete, goal-setting and
the ability to take coaching, direction and criticism .... Competitive basketball has
also given me recognition in the community, and provided me with the opportunity to
meet new people.... Competitive basketball has also supplied me with a meaningful
outlet for intense physical exercise and an enjoyment and happiness that cannot be
duplicated in an open gym or intramural setting.
87. See id. at 1196.
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being a perpetual observer" of practice and games. 88 Although
"Knapp continues to be a member of the team and continues to re-
ceive his scholarship,.., he is not able to practice or compete with the
team."89
Finally, based upon expert medical opinion, the court concluded
that Knapp was "otherwise qualified" to play intercollegiate basket-
ball for Northwestern.90 That is, after listening to the testimony of
five highly qualified cardiologists,91 the court determined that the risk
to Knapp of recurrent VF from playing intercollegiate basketball was
not substantial.92
C. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Northwestern and Taylor filed an emergency notice of appeal and
sought a stay of enforcement of the injunction on September 27,
1996. 93 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted the
stay pending appeal, entered an expedited briefing schedule, and
heard oral arguments just weeks later. 94 After reviewing the legal de-
terminations of the district court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the trial court had abused its discretion and reversed it on every ques-
tion of law on which it had ruled in construing the Rehabilitation
Act.
9 5
The appellate court opened its opinion with the major life activity
issue. It expressed the view that "intercollegiate basketball obviously
is not in and of itself a major life activity, as it is not a basic function of
life on the same level as walking, breathing, and speaking. Not every-
88. See id.
89. Id. at 1194.
90. See id. at 1196-98.
91. Knapp's experts, whom the court credited, opined that although intense exercise could
increase the risk to Knapp of recurrent VF, the risk was extremely low. The court found most
persuasive evidence indicating that the risk of recurrent VF appears to decrease with time. See
id. at 1197.
92. See id. at 1196. The "otherwise qualified" issue in the case turned solely on the substan-
tiality of the risk; no one disputed that Knapp could "meet all of the program's requirements in
spite of his handicap." Id.
93. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2454 (1997).
94. See id. The Seventh Circuit was well aware that practice for the 1996-97 Wildcat basket-
ball season opened in early November and sought to resolve the dispute before the team's first
practice.
95. See id. at 479-86. A district court's grant of a permanent injunction is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1987). Legal con-
clusions receive de novo review; legal error may establish an abuse of discretion. See id. The
Seventh Circuit determined that the Rehabilitation Act presented legal questions requiring de
novo review. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 478.
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one gets to go to college, let alone play intercollegiate sports. '96 The
court subsequently torpedoed Knapp's argument that intercollegiate
sports may be one part of the major life activity of learning for certain
students generally, and for Knapp in particular. 97 It "decline[d] to de-
fine the major life activity of learning in such a way that the Act ap-
plies whenever someone wants to play intercollegiate
athletics .... [Major life activities] are basic functions, not more spe-
cific ones such as being an astronaut, working as a firefighter, driving
a race car, or learning by playing Big Ten Basketball.
'98
Next, the court shifted to the issue of substantial limitation, warn-
ing that "what constitutes learning for a particular individual occurs
within reasonable limits-coverage of the Rehabilitation Act is not
open-ended or based on every dream or desire that a person may
have." 99 It then quickly concluded that Knapp's ability to learn was
not substantially limited:
[L]earning through playing intercollegiate basketball is only one
part of the education available to Knapp at Northwest-
ern .... Knapp is an intelligent student and athlete, and the inabil-
ity to play intercollegiate basketball at Northwestern forecloses only
a small portion of his collegiate opportunities .... The Rehabilita-
tion Act does not guarantee an individual the exact educational ex-
perience that he may desire, just a fair one.100
Even assuming the appellate court had concluded that Knapp was
"disabled" under the Rehabilitation Act, it still was not inclined to
afford him the opportunity to play intercollegiate basketball for
Northwestern. The court applied its own version of the full court
press and held, as a matter of law, that Knapp was not "otherwise
qualified" to play for the Wildcats. 10 1
At trial, experts for both parties had agreed on all the basic scien-
tific principles, disagreeing only in their medical opinion on the ulti-
mate question-the substantiality of the risk.10 2 After reviewing the
record, the appellate court acknowledged the conflicting opinion evi-
dence regarding the risk posed for Knapp by his playing NCAA bas-
ketball. 0 3 Knapp's experts believed it was an acceptable risk;1°4
96. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480.
97. See id. at 480-81.
98. Id. at 481.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 481-82.
101. See id. at 482.
102. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (N.D. IlI. 1996), rev'd 101
F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997).
103. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483-84.
104. See id. at 483. The court noted:
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Northwestern's experts backed Dr. Sweeney in saying that the risk to
Knapp from participation in NCAA basketball was unacceptable.
Neither of Northwestern's highly qualified experts, however, were
willing to attempt to quantify the precise risk involved. 10 5 The district
court determined that when presented with conflicting opinion evi-
dence regarding risk, where not a single scientific study squarely on
point existed to quantify that risk, the decision as to whether Knapp
should play NCAA basketball rested with the court.'0 6 The appellate
court disagreed. It believed that when presented with conflicting
medical testimony, courts ought to leave the medical decision to team
doctors and universities as long as the determination was reasonable,
rational and considerate of reasonable accommodations: 10 7
[T]he university has the right to determine that an individual is not
otherwise medically qualified to play without violating the Rehabili-
tation Act. The place of the court in such cases is to make sure that
the decision-maker has reasonably considered and relied upon suffi-
cient evidence specific to the individual and the potential injury, not
to determine on its own which evidence it believes is more
persuasive. 108
In closing, the Seventh Circuit offered these words:
Dr. John H. McAnulty, one of Knapp's experts, testified at the injunction hearing that
the annual risk of death to Knapp as a result of his cardiac condition under a worst-case
scenario is 2.4 percent and that playing intercollegiate basketball would elevate this
annual risk to 2.93 percent .... Dr. Brian Olshansky, another expert for Knapp, put
Knapp's risk of death for the 1996-97 basketball season at no greater than 1 in 100.
These estimates took into account Knapp's internal defibrillator ....
Id.
105. See id. at 483-84. "According to Dr. Barry J. Maron, one of Northwestern's experts,
based on a 10-year study, the risk of nontraumatic death for the average male college basketball
player is 1 in 28,818. Dr. Maron further testified that participation in intercollegiate basketball
significantly increases Knapp's risk of death .... " Id. Maron could not define significant risk in
terms of numbers but essentially believed an unquantifiable significant risk signals a substantial
risk. Dr. Douglas Zipes, Northwestern's other expert, agreed. He went so far as to say that a .1
percent risk of death to Knapp from playing NCAA basketball was too much.
106. See Knapp, 942 F. Supp. at 1197. The district court stated:
We have nothing more exotic here than highly qualified experts, in agreement on all
the basic scientific principles and differing only in their medical judgment on the final
question.... All possess the education, training and experience required to become
experts and none disputes the expertise of the others. The range of disagreement is
extremely narrow, confined only to the dimensions of the risk of recurrence and the
effect of the passage of time on that risk .... [M]y task is to consider all the opinions
and determine which are most persuasive. It is what the trial of disputes such as this
will sometimes require. It might have been better to have left the choice to a panel of
physicians, but Congress left it with the courts and the random assignment of this case
has left it here with me.
I again find the opinions of Drs. McAnulty, Rink and Olshansky to be persuasive and I
find that the risk to Nicholas Knapp of a repeat epidsode is not substantial.
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[W]e are not saying Northwestern's decision necessarily is the right
decision. We say only that it is not an illegal one under the Rehabil-
itation Act. On the same facts, another team physician at another
university, reviewing the same medical history, physical evaluation,
and medical recommendations, might reasonably decide that Knapp
met the physical qualifications for playing on an intercollegiate bas-
ketball team. Simply put, all universities need not evaluate risk the
same way. What we say in this case is that if substantial evidence
supports the decision-maker-here Northwestern-that decision
must be respected. 10 9
V. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
In Knapp, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit improp-
erly upheld Northwestern University's decision to bar Nicholas Knapp
from participation as an active member in the Wildcat intercollegiate
basketball program. In so doing, the court incorrectly ruled that: 1)
Knapp was not a "disabled person" within the meaning of the Act;
and 2) he was not "otherwise qualified" to play intercollegiate basket-
ball for Northwestern.
Contrary to the court's legal determination, Knapp was "dis-
abled" within the meaning of the Act because: 1) Northwestern per-
ceived that he had a serious and permanent cardiovascular
impairment; 2) the impairment, by precluding his participation in the
university's intercollegiate basketball program, limited an integral and
irreplaceable part of his educational experience; and 3) the impair-
ment constituted a substantial limitation on his learning because, in
light of Knapp's experience in competitive sports and his goals and
expectations, no other activity or opportunity the university offered
could provide the same educational benefit as he could receive from
active participation in the intercollegiate basketball program.
Apart from these analytical miscues, the appellate court's most
flagrant foul came when it decided against Knapp on the "otherwise
qualified" issue. Knapp indeed was "otherwise qualified" to partici-
pate because playing basketball would not create a substantial risk of
injury to him or to others. In reaching this determination, the district
court weighed the testimony of all the witnesses and the facts
presented regarding Knapp's medical condition-including the testi-
mony of three well-qualified cardiologists who agreed that Knapp
should be allowed to play intercollegiate basketball-and properly
109. Id. at 485.
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chose not to defer to the opinions of either Northwestern's or Knapp's
medical experts.
As part of its reversal of the district court, the Seventh Circuit
created a legal standard that binds persons with disabilities and the
courts to a recipient's subjective determination as to whether it has
violated the Rehabilitation Act. The consequences of this aspect of
the decision reach far beyond the facts of Knapp, or any single case
for that matter. By requiring judicial deference to recipient deci-
sionmakers, who in most cases possess no greater medical expertise
than the court, but who may have institutional concerns not appropri-
ately considered under the Rehabilitation Act, the court creates an
insurmountable burden for persons with disabilities who have been
excluded from essential services or programs. Simply stated, judicial
deference to a recipient's assessment regarding the significance of a
risk of serious injury does not provide substantive review of the recipi-
ent's decision but instead, creates an irrebutable presumption in favor
of the recipient.
B. Knapp Is "Disabled" Within the Meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act.
Knapp was "disabled" within the meaning of the Act and entitled
to section 504's protections because: 1) Northwestern regarded
Knapp as having a permanent cardiovascular impairment constituting
a "physical impairment" under the Act; 2) intercollegiate sports can,
and in Knapp's case did, play a major role in a student's education and
learning process; and 3) competitive basketball was an important and
integral part of Knapp's education and learning experience and the
fact that Northwestern would not allow Knapp to play constituted a
"substantial limitation" on Knapp's learning.
1. Northwestern views Knapp as having a permanent life-
threatening cardiovascular condition that rises to the level
of an impairment under the act.
Northwestern regarded Knapp as having a permanent life-threat-
ening cardiovascular impairment-an abnormal heart. Northwestern
itself conceded this point. The lens through which Northwestern saw
Knapp provided it with a view of his heart condition which precluded
Knapp's participation in intercollegiate basketball, whether for North-
western or some other university.
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The Act, however, protects those who are "regarded" as having a
physical impairment even when they do not. Cardiovascular problems
constitute a defined impairment under the regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Act. Thus, there was no dispute that Knapp was "re-
garded as having ... an impairment."' 10
2. Playing intercollegiate basketball is a major life activity because
it is an integral part of the education and learning process.
The appellate court incorrectly concluded that intercollegiate ath-
letics does not rise to the level of a major life activity merely because
it is only a component, at most, of the learning process. The relevant
federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, case law ad-
dressing the right of student-athletes to compete despite physical im-
pairments, scholarly commentary, and policy statements by the
NCAA and major universities all support the conclusion that intercol-
legiate athletics do reach "learning." The Knapp court, however, re-
jected these authorities.
To be sure, regulations implementing the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act 1 ' define "major life activities" as "those basic activities
that the average person in the general population can perform with
little or no difficulty."11 2 However, as stated above, the argument that
intercollegiate sports cannot be a major life activity because the "aver-
age person" may not have the skill to play them misses the point. In-
tercollegiate sports may be a major life activity, not just in and of
themselves, as cases abound, but as a subset of learning. Not every-
one can play intercollegiate basketball, but learning is an activity
which the "average person" can and does perform.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1994). Knapp does not take away with the left hand what he
gives with the right by arguing that the risk of injury to him from playing intercollegiate basket-
ball is not substantial while, at the same time, arguing that he is "disabled" and entitled to pro-
tection under the Act. The case law hews to no such line. The detrimental consequences of
illegal discrimination can be just as real for someone who is "regarded" as having a physical
impairment as for someone who actually has an impairment. See School Bd. of Nassau County
v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). Further, Knapp may be eligible to seek relief as a "disabled
person" under the Act because Northwestern claims to base its perception of his ostensible
debilitating heart condition on the "record" of Knapp's heart problem, including the episode of
ventricular fibrillation and subsequent receipt of an ICD. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(ii); Arline,
480 U.S. at 281; see also 34 C.F.R. pt. 104 app. A at 353 (record of heart disease or cancer are
examples of conditions which establish "record" of impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
112. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i) at 402. "[T]he regulations interpreting the ADA
provide guidance on how to interpret these [the Act's] terms .... " Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d
721, 725 (7th Cir. 1995).
1998]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Here, Northwestern perceives that Knapp has a physical impair-
ment that prevents him from playing intercollegiate basketball. Such
a handicap places upon Knapp, as it would upon every "otherwise
qualified" student-athlete, a limitation on the major life activity of
learning. Put another way and consistent with the clear import of the
district court's opinion, intercollegiate sports are, in general, an inte-
gral part of the major life activity of learning and certainly that is so
for Knapp in particular.
Contrary to the appellate court's concern, this analysis does not
define the major life activity of learning in such a way that the Act
applies whenever someone wants to play intercollegiate athletics. An
athlete seeking protection from discrimination under the Act must
still proffer evidence demonstrating that she is both "substantially lim-
ited" in the major life activity of learning and "otherwise qualified" to
participate in the program sought. It is the rare case-and Knapp's
situation is rare-where an athlete with a disability is nonetheless ca-
pable of performing all the requirements of a service or program. The
Rehabilitation Act will not apply to someone who wants to play Big
Ten basketball, to be an astronaut, to work as a fire fighter, or to drive
a race car, unless that person satisfies all three prongs of the Act. By
analyzing the issue in a vacuum and putting the squeeze on the "major
life activity" definition, the court debunks the ability of disabled indi-
viduals to secure protection under the Act in those rare cases.
3. A perceived serious cardiovascular condition that precludes a
student-athlete from playing intercollegiate athletics
substantially limits learning, a major life activity.
The district court examined the impact to Knapp of the disability
Northwestern imputes to him-namely, his inability to be an active
member of the basketball program. The court then correctly deter-
mined that such a perceived impairment would be a substantial depri-
vation for Knapp of an integral and irreplaceable component of the
major life activity of learning. The district court easily found that
playing intercollegiate basketball is an essential and integral part of
Knapp's educational experience. After all, highly trained athletes,
like Knapp, devote literally thousands of hours of time training and
developing skills, and they reap significant educational benefits from
that effort. Further, in recognition of Knapp's training and ability,
Northwestern sought him out and provided him with a full scholarship
so that he could be a "student-athlete"-an individual who attends
classes and plays intercollegiate sports for the university.
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The Seventh Circuit, however, chose not only to snub the district
court's well-reasoned opinion, but existing case law as well. The
court's analysis, in finding that Knapp is not "substantially limited,"
ignores the reasoning in E.E. Black. In that case, the court concluded
that the plaintiff was substantially limited in his pursuit of becoming a
journeyman because no similar positions were available to him.1
13
Like the journeyman, Knapp trained extensively for the opportunity
to play intercollegiate basketball. He accepted Northwestern's offer
to attend school there with the expectation of playing intercollegiate
basketball for its team. The disability that Northwestern imputes to
Knapp, however, bars him from playing intercollegiate basketball, not
just at Northwestern, but at any university.
The appellate court borrowed its reasoning on this issue from a
line of employment cases 1 4 and inappropriately placed it into the
nonanalogous context of athletics and education. That line of cases,
which holds that exclusion from participation in one particular job
does not substantially limit the major life activity of working, is not
availing in a case like Knapp's. Here, one could argue, as Northwest-
ern did, that exclusion from participation in one extra-curricular activ-
ity does not substantially limit learning because student-athletes, like
Knapp, can engage in other extracurricular activities-perhaps the
school band or debate team-and reap the same educational benefits
as playing intercollegiate basketball. Such a narrow approach to the
"substantial limitation" issue would serve only to perpetuate handicap
discrimination.
Granted, the Pahulu court, also cited by the Seventh Circuit,
chose to follow this exact approach. That court concluded that exclu-
sion of a football player from Kansas' intercollegiate football team did
not substantially limit that player's learning because he could partici-
pate in other extracurricular activities. 115
But the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit should have
rejected the reasoning of Pahulu on this point and held that North-
western's exclusion of Knapp from the school's basketball team did
substantially limit his learning. The district court astutely explained
why:
I do not disagree that participation in the band or orchestra may
give a student who has trained for years on a particular instrument
an educational experience similar to that of intercollegiate athletics.
113. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1102 (D. Haw. 1980).
114. See supra note 40.
115. See Pahulu v. University of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Kan. 1995).
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However, the law is not satisfied by telling a student who has
trained for years to play basketball that the student can now play in
the school band or orchestra instead and receive the same educa-
tional experience. It also undermines the purpose of the Rehabilita-
tion Act not to allow a disabled individual to pursue his chosen field
particularly so when that field is chosen without knowing of the dis-
ability. Furthermore, there are relatively few, if any, activities that
demand the same level of teamwork, precision, and discipline as an
intercollegiate sport to which a person can transfer particular
skills.
116
The limitation placed upon the major life activity of learning also
cannot be offset, as the Knapp court would have it, by allowing Knapp
to attend team meetings, practices and games as a passive observer
and not an active participant, and by continuing his athletic scholar-
ship with the university. Using nothing more than common sense, the
district court correctly determined on this issue that:
It is the activity of practice and competition that constitutes a large
part of the learning experience for Knapp. Being able to attend
games and travel with the team does not make up for not being able
to practice with the team and have a reasonable chance to play in
games. It is the playing of basketball that teaches discipline, team-
work, and perseverance. These traits are not developed by being a
perpetual observer.
117
Having an opportunity to actually play on the university's basket-
ball team is simply not the same as being allowed to attend the school
and merely watch the basketball team play. The Seventh Circuit, once
again, improperly accepted the contrary conclusion on this issue in
Pahulu. Pahulu concluded, after a detailed analysis, that intercollegi-
ate football was a major life activity for the plaintiff. But then, in one
paragraph without citation, the Pahulu court inexplicably ruled that
Kansas' disqualification of the football player did not substantially
limit him because he still had his scholarship, which allowed him to
attend school for free and join extracurricular activities, including the
opportunity to participate in the football program as an observer. 118
This analysis was misguided. While receiving the scholarship pro-
vided Knapp an economic benefit, the scholarship itself is not what
makes interscholastic athletics so educationally valuable. How the
Pahulu court could have concluded that a student-athlete would ob-
tain, even remotely, the same educational benefits from watching his
116. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd 101 F.3d
473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997).
117. Id. at 1196.
118. See Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1393.
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team as he could acquire from having the opportunity to be an active
member of it is difficult to understand.
In sum, case law and common sense illustrate that the Seventh
Circuit should have concluded that: 1) intercollegiate athletics may be
an integral and unique component of learning, a major life activity;
and 2) Knapp's physical impairment, as perceived by Northwestern,
substantially limits his learning. It incorrectly determined that Knapp
is not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act.
C. Knapp Is "Otherwise Qualified" to Play Intercollegiate
Basketball.
1. The district court properly found the risk to Knapp from
playing intercollegiate basketball is not substantial.
The district court assessed the testimony of the cardiologists at
trial and concluded that the risk of injury to Knapp from playing inter-
collegiate basketball was not substantial. The court found that any
risk to Knapp from his participation as an active member of the bas-
ketball team was, at most, remote or minimal. Therefore, because
there was no question that Knapp possessed all of the skills necessary
to play basketball for Northwestern, the court held that Knapp was
"otherwise qualified" under section 504 of the Act." 9
2. Because the district court found the risk to knapp is not
substantial, Knapp is "otherwise qualified" to play
intercollegiate basketball at Northwestern.
Because Knapp established that the risk to him from participa-
tion is not substantial, the district court properly ruled that Northwest-
ern's permanent exclusion of him violates the Act. After all, a
disabled person is "otherwise qualified" to participate in an activity if
the risk to that person from participation is not substantial. The mere
elevation of risk to Knapp from his playing intercollegiate basket-
ball-a minimal or remote risk of recurrent cardiac episode which
could not be restored to normal by his ICD-is without more, insuffi-
119. The district court also appropriately recognized that the increased risk to Knapp from
playing intercollegiate basketball, not the total risk to Knapp of having a second cardiac event,
to be the issue. After all, Northwestern did not exclude Knapp from the library merely because
his risk of a cardiac event while studying is higher than the average student's. For the trial court
to compare the total risk to Knapp to that of the average person in the general population would
have been inappropriate because the starting point for assessing the risk to Knapp is based upon
his prior cardiac episode.
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cient to justify Northwestern's refusal to permit him to play for its
basketball team.
In deciding this case, the district court drew from the decisions of
several other courts. In the context of excluding a student-athlete
from participating in a school's athletic program by reason of disabil-
ity, courts have concluded that the law requires schools to allow the
excluded student-athletes to participate where the risk to them is not
substantial.
The evidence submitted compelled the district court to find that
the risk to Knapp from playing intercollegiate basketball was not sub-
stantial. Accordingly, the court properly found Knapp is qualified to
perform the essential function of the position he sought-competing
for Northwestern's intercollegiate basketball team.
120
3. The Rehabilitation Act requires courts, not recipients, to
determine whether a disabled person is "otherwise
qualified" to participate in an activity because
the risk to that person from that
activity is not substantial.
In accordance with the Act the district court was required to re-
view Northwestern's exclusion of Knapp with heightened scrutiny and
resolve the conflicting expert medical opinion concerning his medical
condition to pinpoint the substantiality of risk to Knapp. After all,
Northwestern sought to exclude Knapp solely by reason of the cardiac
condition it imputed to him and the substantial risk which purportedly
accompanied it.
The Seventh Circuit incorrectly determined that Northwestern's
asserting a rational basis for excluding Knapp does, in itself, legally
justify that decision. Rational behavior is no defense under the
120. Again, Knapp's case is not one where the physical impairment prevents him from per-
forming the essential functions of the position he seeks. No one is saying Knapp's condition
prevents him from running the floor, shooting three-pointers, or diving for loose balls. If that
were the case, his disability would absolutely preclude him from participation because he could
not perform the activity at the required skill level.
Any suggestion that the district court's decision will result in a flood of "eligibility" litiga-
tion is devoid of merit. Decisions like Poole and Wright have been available for over fifteen
years. The adage "the proof is in the pudding" applies here-legal cases involving a student who
can perform all of the functions of an active team member, like Knapp, but are still excluded
because of a disability, real or impaired, are rare. At the same time, federal law explicitly pro-
hibits universities which receive federal assistance from excluding an "otherwise qualified dis-
abled" student-athlete from its intercollegiate teams on the basis of handicap. Thus, if a school's
team physician denies a student the opportunity to participate on an intercollegiate team solely
on the basis of that athlete's handicap and the student can prove in a court of law that he is not
at substantial risk of injury, that student is entitled to relief under the Act.
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Act.121 Instead, the Act requires the trial court to employ special care
in inquiring whether Knapp is in fact "otherwise qualified" to partici-
pate on Northwestern's basketball team. To allow a recipient like
Northwestern to justify an exclusion decision by fears of death or in-
jury based on remote, minimal, or unknown medical risks of future
injury would undermine the policy of the Act because the risk to
nearly all handicapped persons is greater than that of the average
person.
Northwestern's reason for excluding Knapp was premised solely
upon his cardiovascular impairment. To show that he was "otherwise
qualified," Knapp presented medical evidence demonstrating that the
risk to him from playing basketball was not substantially increased.
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,122 the Supreme
Court made clear that it is the trier of fact's responsibility "to conduct
an individualized inquiry and make appropriate findings of fact" as to
whether the risk to a disabled plaintiff is substantial.123 Pursuant to
this inquiry, a district court's findings should be based on "reasonable
medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge.' 24 Consis-
tent with Arline, federal courts, like the district court here, have regu-
larly weighed the conflicting opinions of medical experts and related
facts in deciding whether a person can be excluded from an activity
because the risk to that person is substantial. By acting as the final
arbiter of disputes, the trial court protects the right of the disabled
person to participate in activities for which she is qualified to perform
as well as the recipient's interest in operating a program that does not
place its participants at substantial risk of injury. 125
121. The Rehabilitation Act was established to ensure that disabled persons would have the
right to participate, even when the excluding decision-maker is well-meaning and has the best of
intentions. The Tenth Circuit noted in Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372
(10th Cir. 1981) that "[d]iscrimination on the basis of handicap usually results from more invidi-
ous causative elements and often occurs under the guise of extending a helping hand or a mis-
taken, restrictive belief as to the limitations of handicapped persons." Id. at 1385.
122. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
123. See id. at 287. The Arline court went on to say that "[s]uch an inquiry is essential if
§ 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on
prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate
concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks." Id.
124. Id. at 288.
125. See, e.g., Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 25 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
district court was required to weigh the testimony of competing medical experts to determine
whether diabetic plaintiffs were "otherwise qualified" to drive school buses); Doe v. New York
Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 779 (2d Cir. 1981) (in remanding the case to the district court for a trial on
the merits, the Second Circuit instructed: "The court is required to perform the disagreeable task
of considering Doe's entire psychiatric history and weighing the expert testimony on each side");
Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (weighing conflicting evidence of medical
experts concerning nature of risk to determine whether rejection of insulin-dependent diabetic
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In Knapp, Northwestern failed to persuade the trial court that the
risk to Knapp was substantial. Northwestern's experts relied almost
exclusively on general medical guidelines concerning Knapp's pur-
ported cardiac problem. 126 Knapp's experts, his primary treating car-
diologist and two of the leading electrophysiologists in the country,
felt it inappropriate to rely solely upon broad classifications to render
their opinions, but instead based their opinions on an individualized
assessment of Knapp's current medical condition.127 On this record,
the district court determined that the general guidelines were not con-
clusive on the question of the risk to Knapp.128
When there is no dispute that a disabled person can perform all
the tasks of an activity, but that person is excluded because of a fear
that future participation could create a substantial risk of injury, the
issue will often involve the resolution of conflicting medical opin-
ions. 29 Where a "disabled" plaintiff is able to persuade a court that
the risk to him is not substantial, courts' giving deference to a recipi-
ent's exclusion decision merely because that decision is rational and
reasonable-as the Seventh Circuit did in Knapp-undermines the
purpose and protections of the Act.
applicants for agent position was appropriate), affd 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989). See also Wright
v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (accepting medical opinions of plain-
tiff's opthamologist over those of Columbia's team physician in finding the risk to a one-eyed
football player was not substantial); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 952
(D. N.J. 1980) (finding medical opinions of plaintiff's experts persuasive and would not substi-
tute those opinions for rational medical opinions of defendant school board).
126. See supra note 76.
127. Northwestern's experts never examined Knapp and never communicated with North-
western's team physicians prior to trial.
128. Applying generalizations and groupings, like the Bethesda Conference Guidelines, to
individual medical situations is a form of stereotyping used to justify exclusion decisions. See
Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88. A district court may give weight to the general guidelines of a na-
tional conference of a group of private physicians like those promulgated by the participants of
the 26th Bethesda Conference and set forth in the document entitled the "Recommendations for
Determining Eligibility for Competition in Athletes with Cardiovascular Abnormalities." The
district court in Knapp gave serious consideration to those general recommendations. This
should not mean, however, as the Seventh Circuit now holds, that the trial court must defer to
the recommendations of a private medical conference or private physicians upon which the
grantee claims to rely, especially when the disabled person has proven through competent evi-
dence that the activity does not create a substantial risk of injury to him/her. At trial, Knapp
successfully exposed the lack of scientific data relied upon by the 26th Bethesda Conference
participants for those recommendations which arguably applied to him and the overly restrictive
attitudes upon which those recommendations were based. In addition, Knapp introduced signifi-
cant medical evidence through other well-respected cardiologists which the trial court ultimately
found to be more persuasive as it concerned Knapp's situation.
129. "Years ago physicians who testified in court often said that medicine was an art and not
a science. This is much less true today than it was in the 1960's .... See Mercado v. Ahmed, 756
F. Supp. 1097, 1101 n.7 (N.D. IU. 1991). Yet there is still truth in the old saw .... " Knapp v.
Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd, 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2454 (1997).
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As the purpose of the Act is to promote inclusion and participa-
tion of disabled persons, to defer to the recipient's exclusion decision
solely because the recipient can obtain a reasonable medical opinion
from a hired medical expert is illogical. 130 In Davis v. Meese,131 the
Pennsylvania district court was faced with the dilemma of resolving
competing qualified medical expert opinions rendered by private phy-
sicians on the issue of the acceptability of the risk of harm posed by
the FBI's potential employment of insulin-dependent diabetics as spe-
cial agents. Each side to the dispute presented expert medical testi-
mony on the issue of risk.. The Davis court determined that the Act
required that this dispute needed to be resolved by the trial court
without deferring to the reasonable medical opinions upon which the
FBI was relying. The court stated:
[I1n this case neither party challenged the qualifications of the other
party's expert witnesses. Because of the divergence of medical
opinion expressed by the experts, obviously complete deference
cannot logically be given to each expert. Only by assessing the rela-
tive merit and strength of the opinions can a proper determination
be made in this case ....
... Where, as here, qualified medical opinion is divided as to what is
an acceptable degree of risk, a decision must be made.
132
Upon weighing the evidence on the factors of risk of harm to the
handicapped applicants and to others from the potential employment
of insulin-dependent diabetics as special agents, the Davis court made
the factual determination that the risk was too great. 133 Accordingly,
such applicants were not "otherwise qualified" for the position.
The district court here was faced with the same dilemma as the
Davis court-conflicting views of qualified private physicians concern-
ing the issue of substantiality of risk. Like the court in Davis, the
court determined that deference to the opinions of Northwestern's
doctors (or experts) was inappropriate.
In so ruling, the district court properly determined that Pahulu
applied an incorrect standard on this issue. In Pahulu, the court de-
clined to decide that the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" because
130. The illogic of having a trial court "rubber stamp" an expert opinion is especially appar-
ent when considering that experts often receive thousands of dollars to render medical opinions
in litigation. The danger of "shopping" for expert medical opinion is one more reason courts
should refrain from giving deference to either party's expert witnesses.
131. 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affid, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989).




the defendant university's decision was "reasonable and rational."'1 34
Consistent with the policy of the Act and other cases that have ad-
dressed the issue, the court here weighed the conflicting testimony
and related evidence and reached its conclusion on the facts that the
risk to Knapp was not substantial, and therefore, Northwestern could
not exclude him.
135
D. The Seventh Circuit Sidesteps the Supreme Court Decision in
Arline.
1. Courts must make individualized inquiries and appropriate
findings of fact.
Congress recognized that legitimate reasons might exist to justify
the exclusion of a particular individual with a disability from a particu-
lar benefit or job.136 However, realizing that allowing exclusion based
upon the articulation of a legitimate concern might undermine any
meaningful protection from discrimination, the Supreme Court, as
stated above, has required courts to make an independent assessment
as to the legitimacy of a recipient's concerns. 137 The Arline court
squarely placed the responsibility for making an individualized in-
quiry, making findings of fact, and giving appropriate weight to the
competing concerns of recipients and disabled individuals on the
courts, not on recipients seeking to bar disabled persons from partici-
134. Pahulu v. University of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Kan. 1995). The Pahulu court
rendered its decision on this point in one paragraph without citation to any legal authority and
without any other explanation for its decision.
135. One commentator has written:
A college has no substantial justification for excluding a handicapped adult from
school-sponsored athletics if competent physicians reach conflicting participation rec-
ommendations based on an individualized physical examination and different evalua-
tion of the medical risks.
The Act prohibits a university from substituting its decision for a considered decision of
a fully-informed adult athlete to participate in athletics supported by a credible medical
opinion.
Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities: Who Makes the
Participation Decision, 71 NEB. L. REXV. 987, 1021-22 (1992).
The standard which the district court and the Davis court employed, which calls for the trier
of fact to act as the "neutral" arbiter of the opinion of medical experts, is more favorable to the
recipient than the standard employed in Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa.
1981). In Wright, the court found, consistent with Mitten's recommended approach, for the
plaintiff student-athlete in deference to the medical opinions of his physicians and his decision
on the risk issue. In light of the Act's policy of inclusion and protection of the right of the
disabled person to have an equal opportunity to participate, such an approach is more consistent
with the purpose of the Act than one that calls for blind deference to the excluding institution's
private physician.
136. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
137. See id.
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pation in their services or programs. The Seventh Circuit's decision in
Knapp, which deferred completely to the exclusion decision made by
Northwestern, conflicts with the Supreme Court's allocation of re-
sponsibility under the Rehabilitation Act.
The Seventh Circuit provided no explanation for its departure
from Arline. Instead, it noted that the Arline court refrained from
determining the weight to be given to the medical judgment of private
physicians.138 In Arline, a school teacher fired because she had tuber-
culosis sued the school board under the Rehabilitation Act.' 39 The
Supreme Court stated that in making an individualized "otherwise
qualified" inquiry, "courts normally should defer to the reasonable
medical judgments of public health officials.' 140 The Arline court's
observation that it was not addressing the weight to be given to the
testimony of private physicians does not mean that it failed to address
the very different question of who should make the requisite findings
of fact based upon that testimony. In addition, far from indicating
that the Supreme Court intended that the same level of deference ac-
corded to the medical opinions of public health officials be accorded
to the opinions of private consultants, the Supreme Court's notation
on this point suggests that the deference afforded to private physicians
should be less. This conclusion follows from the fact that while public
health officials' role and responsibility is the objective assessment of
medical risks and potential future harm to the public, private physi-
cians simply do not play the same role or bear the same responsibility.
2. A court's findings of fact must include a determination as to the
substantiality of the risk.
The Supreme Court also has provided instruction as to the exact
findings of fact a district court must make before an individual can be
excluded based upon risk of future injury. The requisite findings of
fact include the following four factors: (1) the nature of the risk; (2)
its duration; (3) its severity; and (4) the probability that the injury or
harm will occur and the varying degrees of severity if it does.141 With-
out explanation, the Knapp court essentially ruled that the fourth and
final factor may be discounted by concluding that courts should re-
138. See Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2454 (1997).
139. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.




frain from independently evaluating the significance of the risk of in-
jury in any cases where the potential injury is serious harm or death.
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "consensus recommenda-
tions of several physicians in a certain field do carry weight" 142 does
not support abdication of the courts' ultimate role-to determine
whether all the factors contributing to a conclusion of significant risk
have been appropriately and impartially considered. It must be within
the province of courts to assess impartially whether a recipient's ex-
clusion of a disabled person falls within the narrowly defined defenses
of the Act. Otherwise, the determination as to whether a recipient
has met the appropriate legal standard hinges upon the partisan point-
of-view of the recipient. The Seventh Circuit itself conceded that "on
the same facts, another team physician at another university, review-
ing the same medical history, physical evaluation, and medical recom-
mendations, might reasonably decide that Knapp met the physical
qualifications for playing on an intercollegiate basketball team.
'143
Consequently, the determination as to the legality of a disabled per-
son's exclusion under the Act depends not on an individualized assess-
ment of the quantifiable risks presented, but upon the recipient's
subjective evaluation of what nature or level of risk is significant or
intolerable. Such a result is antithetical to the Rehabilitation Act's
primary purpose of protecting individuals with disabilities from depri-
vation of their rights based solely upon a recipient's articulation of an
allegedly legitimate concern.
144
E. Ramifications of Knapp v. Northwestern
A district court's review of a defendant's assessment as to the
significance of risk presented by participation of disabled individuals
creates an irrebutable presumption in favor of a recipient. Under
Knapp, recipients are free to ignore or undervalue opposing evidence
regarding the magnitude of risk, even when no one other than the
disabled person is subjected to the risk. Plaintiffs and the courts may
challenge only the recipient's process in making the determination but
cannot challenge the substantive determination as to the significance
of risk.
Creating an irrebutable presumption in favor of recipients alters
the allocation of burdens under the Act. Under Pushkin, once the
142. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 485.
143. Id.
144. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
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plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the defendant-recipient has the
burden of proving that the individual is not otherwise qualified which
showing then can be rebutted by the plaintiff.145 In Knapp, the Sev-
enth Circuit hollows out the established allocation of burdens by al-
lowing a recipient to avoid an impartial assessment of whether a risk is
genuinely substantial. As the district court here and other courts rec-
ognize, judicial deference to a recipient's evaluation of the medical
opinions of its private consultants as to whether a risk is sufficiently
significant to justify exclusion of a disabled person from its programs
or services, regardless of how reasonable and rational, would end
meaningful protection under the Act.
146
VI. CONCLUSION
Persons with disabilities routinely are excluded from obtaining
necessary medical treatment, attending schools, and continuing to
work based solely upon defendants' determinations that these persons
present greater risks of future injury or harm than the defendants are
willing to accommodate. Some defendants, like Northwestern, con-
clude, and argue in defense of their exclusion of disabled persons, that
145. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
146. In the short amount of time since Knapp was decided, the Seventh Circuit's new stan-
dard has already been attacked. As one district court observed:
The Knapp decision would not have the Court make an independent determination of
whether substantial risk and severity of injury is actually risked. Knapp, 101 F.3d at
484. Instead, Knapp holds that the "place of the court in such cases is to make sure that
the decision-maker has reasonably considered and relied upon sufficient evidence spe-
cific to the individual and the potential injury, not to determine on its own which evi-
dence it believes is persuasive." Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484. While an examination into the
evidence relied upon by a decision-maker is important, a district court must also be
permitted to determine whether "in light of [a plaintiff's] work history and medical
history, employment of her would pose a reasonable probablility of substantial harm."
Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1424.
The Knapp Court would allow an individual to be excluded from a position solely on
the basis of the risk of severe injury if the decision to exclude was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Such a standard violates the very purpose of the Rehabilitation Act: no
individual should be excluded from a position when he/she can meet all of the program's
requirements in spite of his/her disability. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 406. Consequently, ifa
decision-maker unnecessarily excludes an individual on the basis of a disability, that deci-
sion should be overturned, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which it was
based. A trier of fact, therefore, ought to be permitted, under the Rehabilitation Act to
determine if risk of injury caused by a disability is such that the individual has been
needlessly excluded from participating in an activity, program, or job.
Mendez v. Gearan, 956 F. Supp. 1520, 1527 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (emphasis added).
The district court in Knapp noted that Northwestern may have made a rational decision that
Knapp's risk is substantial based on reasonable evidence, but it correctly concluded that defer-
ence to the opinions of Northwestern's doctors (or expert witnesses) was inappropriate. The
district court's recognition that it was to decide the issue of the substantiality of the risk when
presented with conflicting medical evidence is consistent with the language of Section 504, the
regulations issued under it and the decisions of the federal courts. The same cannot be said of
the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Knapp.
19981
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
any risk of harm-however unlikely to occur-is intolerable and justi-
fies exclusion. Without meaningful enforcement of anti-discrimina-
tion laws such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the individuals who
are the subject of these determinations are left without protection
from arbitrary exclusion from essential services or programs they seek
to enjoy. It is the role of the courts to ensure meaningful
enforcement.
Meaningful enforcement does not mean that every individual
with a disability, whether it be Nicholas Knapp, the astronaut, the
firefighter, or the race car driver, must be allowed to participate in
every program, activity, service, benefit, or employment opportunity.
It does mean that courts, regardless of whether they determine that
the individual must be included or should be excluded, must make the
ultimate determination of whether a risk of injury presented by inclu-
sion of a person with a disability is significant as contemplated by the
Rehabilitation Act.
The ability of persons with disabilities to exercise autonomy in
basic life decisions, including those that may involve some level of in-
creased personal risk, has been central to the struggle of the disabled
to participate fully as equal citizens in our society. In evaluating the
level of risk presented by the participation of a person with a disabil-
ity, a defendant, and the medical consultants it employs, may inappro-
priately consider significant any risk of death or serious harm.
147
Because the judgment of the defending party, however reasonable,
may not reflect the mandates of the law, to determine what is rational
and reasonable in light of the Act's goal of inclusion and integration is
the role of the courts, as triers of fact. This is particularly so in those
cases where there is disagreement among competent medical experts.
The district court here heeded the mandate of the Act when it
decided the issue of "substantial risk" of future harm-where that is
the sole basis for exclusion-without deference to the medical opin-
ions of Knapp's or Northwestern's private physicians. Only if courts
continue this approach-followed by other circuit and district
courtsl 48-will the appropriate balance between the interests and the
rights of the disabled person, for whom the Act was intended to pro-
147. For example, a defendant may inappropriately elevate institutional concerns such as
liability in its assessment of the significance of a risk.
148. See e.g., Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); Wood v.
Omaha Sch. Dist., 25 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 1994); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1981); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989); Poole
v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
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tect, and the legitimate interests of the defendant-recipient be
maintained.
Northwestern University, a federally funded institution, sought to
exclude Nicholas Knapp, a "disabled" person "otherwise qualified" to
participate in one of its programs, solely on the basis of a disability
Northwestern perceives Knapp to have. Northwestern's conduct vio-
lated the Rehabilitation Act.
